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The Five-Tool Mediator:  
Game Theory, 
Baseball Practices, and  
Southpaw Scouting 
 
Michael N. Widener* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Not everyone can share the fortunes of the departed mega-negotiator 
Richard Holbrooke.1  Most of us never will possess the Ambassador’s size, 
genius, charisma, boundless energy, and relentlessness.2  Genetics, not 
conditioning, determine most of such traits.3  For the remainder, the crucible 
of childhood and adolescence, wildly beyond the control of youth, will 
 
*  The author is counsel to Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, P.C.; Associate Faculty at the 
School of Business, University of Phoenix; and, helpless to hit or throw a curve ball, works indoors.  
This essay is for Newton F. Widener, Jr., my first batterymate. 
 1. Holbrooke, former United Nations Ambassador (1999-2001), was America’s special 
representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the Obama State Department from January, 2009 until 
his death in December, 2010 and was described by President George H.W. Bush as “the most 
persistent advocate I’ve ever run into.”  Roger Cohen, Op-Ed., The Mother of Friendships Lost, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 10, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/opinion/10cohen.html.  His greatest 
achievement in consensus building was brokering the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords that resolved the 
political and humanitarian crisis in Bosnia.  Id.  Holbrooke expressed his belief in the power of 
negotiations to bring peace and prosperity in a politically disintegrating world by way of an 
“improvisation on a theme” style of diplomacy.  Id.  International diplomacy is a special category of 
multiparty negotiations; Holbrooke’s would not have succeeded at Dayton had the United States 
armed forces not been active in destabilizing the confidence of Slobodan Milosevic in his control of 
his land base.  See Robert A. Pape, The True Worth of Air Power, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 
122-23. 
 2. Holbrooke’s 6’2”, barrel-chested frame was imposing and contributed, with his boundless 
energy, to his dominance in bargaining encounters.  See Michael Elliott, Remembering Ambassador 
Richard Holbrooke, TIME, Dec. 14, 2010, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2036847,00.html. 
 3. See WAYNE WEITEN, PSYCHOLOGY: THEMES AND VARIATIONS 283 (2010) (discussing the 
unquestionably inherited nature of height).  A high energy level, like intelligence, is a combination 
of nature and nurture.  See id.  The trait of intelligence remains the subject of scholarly controversy, 
recent scholarship acknowledges that intelligence is a property of human nature that is subject to 
environmental influences.  See id. at 283-84. 
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determine one’s capacity to galvanize others, forging consensus.4  No matter 
how insightful a writer may be, no text—by itself—transmutes its reader 
into an indomitable, force-of-nature-charged neutral.  For non-Holbrookian 
types, improvement in one’s capacity to broker accords can be enhanced 
through adopting certain attitudes characteristic of the Five-Tool Mediator.5 
Consider the technique utilized by most mediators in the ordinary 
course: The contestants were one of America’s largest cities and an office 
building owner whose procedural due process rights were unmistakably 
violated by the municipality, although his damages were of questionable 
calculation.6  During the mediation session, the mediator diligently 
performed customary tasks, urging serious assessment of litigation risk; 
commenting upon the causes of action, defenses, and claims of damages; 
conveying settlement proposals back and forth; and affording each party his 
candid assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of their respective 
 
 4. As a boy, Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill adored his mother who, being a busy wife 
and hostess, had little time for him.  PAUL JOHNSON, CHURCHILL, 8 (2009).  Churchill regarded his 
father with fear and awe; the latter, a brilliant scholar, found Winston to be a disappointment, so also 
made little time for him.  Id. at 9.  A chubby youth, Winston performed poorly in school; he talked 
with a lisp and stuttered.  Id at 1, 9.  Winston’s searing ambition likely arose from his desire to win 
and maintain his absent parents’ approval.  Id. at 109-37.  In time, parental distancing turned him 
into one of the most influential persons in modern British history, galvanizing a nation and its allies 
with his tough, tenacious leadership as Prime Minister during the Second World War.  Id.  At the age 
of 78, he won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1953.  Id. at 151.  Churchill allegedly was left-
handed, but he held his brush in his right hand while painting.  Id. at 158.  A second poor student, 
distanced from his parents and a contemporary of Churchill’s, was Hitler, another galvanizing figure 
in European history. 
 5. The author uses the expression “mediator” throughout as a shorthand generic expression 
for those engaged in the processes of conciliation and other forms of facilitation toward consensus 
building.  A discussion of varieties of facilitative dispute resolution is available in Deborah R. 
Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping 
Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 185-90 (2003).  In baseball parlance, for position 
players, the five tools are (1) hitting for average—lots of times on base—, (2) hitting for power—
causing other runners to score runs—, (3) running speed, (4) arm strength, and (5) fielding ability.  
See MICHAEL M. LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME 3 (2003).  Pitchers 
are regarded as having but three “tools”: arm strength, command—the ability to throw 
consistently—of some number of different pitches, and overall control—the ability consistently to 
throw where the catcher “targets” the pitch to go by the batter.  See Richard Wolfe, Patrick M. 
Wright & Dennis L. Smart, Radical HRM Innovation and Competitive Advantage: The Moneyball 
Story, 45 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 111, 115 (2006).  Five-tool position players include 
household names like Willie Mays, Ken Griffey Jr., Barry Bonds, and Alex Rodriguez, the latter still 
playing for the New York Yankees.  See Mark Bonavita, Baseball’s Five Tools, BEST IN THE GAME 
ATHLETICS, LLC., Mar. 31, 1999, available at http://www.bestinthegame.net/library/baseballs-5-
tools; Albert Chen, Shin-Soo Choo, That’s Who, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 25, 2011, at 64. 
 6. This dispute eventually settled without the mediator’s participation in the ultimate 
discussions, and is based on litigation in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.  
See Smith v. City of Phoenix, CV-10-638-PHX-GMS (D. Ariz. 2010).  The author served as 
mediator in the initial settlement conference. 
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positions, including federal constitutional and ancillary state claims and 
defenses.7  The parties offered a few grudging concessions but fewer overt 
admissions of weakness in their respective positions.8  Indeed, the parties 
moved more than halfway closer to settlement—measured by demand and 
counteroffer—than when they began their session; still, at its close, no 
settlement resulted.9  Instead, the parties departed with the mediator’s final 
estimation of “what it would take to resolve the matter.”  Was this 
mediator’s performance worthy of his compensation?  To what extent did 
the parties and their counsel share responsibility for the collective failure to 
achieve a resolution?  Does the foregoing scenario resonate with your 
experience of facilitation? 
This article encourages mediators to become inciters and advocates for 
an outcome that solves problems, irrespective of the amount in controversy 
and the initial “gap” between offers and counteroffers of settlement.  This is 
not a “how to” article discussing facilitators’ tasks in settlement 
negotiations; instead, the reader should focus more on the mediator’s role in 
the process, advancing the value proposition in negotiations.  The initial 
phase in reordering the thoughts of the mediator is to understand the binary-
oppositions thought tendencies of the parties and their legal representatives; 
likely, all have attitudes that require retooling.10 
This article does not propose that mediators become group therapists, 
but instead urges them to relentlessly explore (1) the essence of each party’s 
intentions and purpose within the controversy, and (2) a range of satisfactory 
outcomes from the perspective of each party.  Once that is accomplished, the 
second, “incitement,” phase may commence.  In this phase, three transitions 
must occur.11  First, the concept of “wounding” must fade into the 
background while the concept of amelioration—the path most proximate to 
making each party whole—assumes the foreground.12  During the first 
transition of the incitement phase, the warriors—those for whom the 
encounter’s savagery matters equally with the outcome—must be disarmed 
 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Litigation is Not the Only Way: Consensus Building 
and Mediation As Public Interest Lawyering, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 50-51 (2002) 
[hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Consensus Building]. 
 11. See JULIE MACFARLANE, THE NEW LAWYER: HOW SETTLEMENT IS TRANSFORMING THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW ix-xii, 11-12, 86-87 (2008). 
 12. See id. 
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and converted into fellow seekers of imaginative solutions to the joint 
problems to be resolved.13  This requires foremost that the mediators alter 
the mind-set of the adversaries from the “binary thinking”14 realm. 
The second transition of the incitement phase takes each party’s belief 
that a “win” is the ultimate goal, and converts this into an understanding that 
there is a problem to be solved, at the lowest possible cost, and in the most 
expeditious manner feasible.15  Additionally, parties need to understand that 
such an outcome is as close to victory as may be realizable.  This transition 
requires moving from pragmatic to imaginative thinking about a 
controversy’s resolution.  A realistic perspective in a controversy, while 
helpful, is not all-sufficient to achieving a resolution in many cases unless a 
third-party adjudicator intervenes and directs the dispute’s outcome.  The 
pragmatist negotiator’s perspective, that the dispute is a transaction whose 
terms have been written down but not yet agreed to, will not guide the 
parties down the path to resolution.16  The appropriate perspective sees the 
dispute resolution environment as a white board, the problem set forth at the 
top, with the resolution schematic remaining to be written.17  Here, every 
possible solution is available for capture, evaluation, and incorporation into 
an overall problem resolution.18  The third transition of the incitement phase 
relates to trust—learning to accept evidence of trust extended by the other 
disputant and to extend indications of trust without expectation of 
reciprocity from the adversary.19 
 
 13. See id. 
 14. See infra Part III.A.  Computers use binary code; thus, the “brain” within the central 
processing unit recognizes only two states: “on” or “off.”  See The Journey Inside, Explore the 
Curriculum, Digital Information, Lesson 1: What is Binary Code?, INTEL, 
http://www97.intel.com/en/TheJourneyInside/ExploretheCurriculum/EC_DigitalInformation/DILess
on1/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).  Switches are arranged along Boolean guidelines, so that these two 
states establish circuits performing logical and mathematical operations.  See Binary—So Simple a 
Computer Can Do It, KERRYR.NET, http://www.kerryr.net/pioneers/binary.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 
2012).  In neuropsychological terms, the human brain’s left hemisphere functions to naturally 
dichotomize, devising an “either/or” view of the world.  See IAIN MCGILCHRIST, THE MASTER AND 
HIS EMISSARY: THE DIVIDED BRAIN AND THE MAKING OF THE WESTERN WORLD 137, 139 (2009) 
[hereinafter MCGILCHRIST, THE DIVIDED BRAIN]. 
 15. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of 
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 764-68 (1984) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Structure of 
Problem Solving]. 
 16. This effectively  recapitulates “adversarial negotiation,” a tendency that inhibits creativity 
in solution discovery, as well summarized by Professor Menkel-Meadow.  See id. at 775-78. 
 17. Conceptualizing the negotiation process as a brainstorming, problem-solving session 
enables the discovery of unanticipated solutions.  See id. at 819, 821-22. 
 18. Cf. id. at 772-75. 
 19. See, e.g., COLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC 
INTERACTION, 83-100 (2003). 
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Adopting these attitudes will set the facilitator on the path to becoming a 
Five-Tool Mediator.  This article is not just valuable for mediators, but 
offers a lens through which to evaluate the talents of a prospective facilitator 
or to gauge a current facilitator’s ongoing performance. 
Section II of this article delves briefly into the influence professional 
baseball has had on the American culture and the lessons it teaches for use in 
facilitative processes in developing collaborative strategies.  The remainder 
of the article describes the five tools of effective mediators. 
II. MEDIATOR LESSONS FROM PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL 
OPERATIONS 
Professional baseball has a hold over a large portion of America’s 
collective psyche, its storied narrative20 and fascinating personalities richly 
texturing each phase of the national pastime.  Perhaps to the dismay of 
idealists, professional baseball’s off-field environment resonates with 
controversy and friction between and among: owners,21 owners and 
players,22 owners and managers,23 owners and unions,24 managers and 
umpires, managers and players,25 players and umpires,26 and players and 
society at large.27 
 
 20. Certainly the most exhaustive non-print media treatment of the pastime is Ken Burns’ 
series first produced for the Public Broadcasting System and aired initially in 1994, with a 
supplemental two part series called “The Tenth Inning” first broadcast in 2010.  Baseball: A Film by 
Ken Burns (PBS television broadcast 1994) [hereinafter Burns], available at 
http://www.pbs.org/kenburns/baseball/.  Recently, one of the fine American baseball writers 
reflected on the infusion of the game in American culture.  See Joe Posnanski, Loving Baseball: 
What Keeps the Grand Game Great? SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 25, 2011, at 50. 
 21. See, e.g., ALBERT T. POWERS, THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 124, 221 (2003) (Bill Veek’s 
marketing of on-field promotions frowned on by other owners). 
 22. Feuds between experienced players and owners arise during contract negotiations with the 
players’ union, during salary arbitration—when it does proceed—, or via agents like Scott Boras.  
See, e.g., Ben McGrath, The Extortionist, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 29, 2007, 
http://www.nypost.com/p/sports/yankees/feuding_reggie_billy_push_885fHmgu7td4RetHQ3hfmO. 
 23. Kayla Webley, Hiring and Firing Billy Martin, TIME, July 13, 2010, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2003503_2003501_2003497,00.html. 
 24. See, e.g., POWERS, supra note 21, at 189-91, 280-82 (discussing owners’ lockout of 
players); Ross Newhan, Umpires’ Union Adds Its Complaint to Mix, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1994 
(explaining that bargaining sessions between owners and the umpires’ union were unsuccessful and 
umpires’ lockout was threatened as of January 1, 1995). 
 25. See, e.g., Dick Schaap, Feuding Reggie, Billy Push Steinbrenner to the Brink, N.Y. POST, 
July 16, 2010, 
http://www.nypost.com/p/sports/yankees/feuding_reggie_billy_push_885fHmgu7td4RetHQ3hfmO. 
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In addition to its controversy, professional baseball, suffused with 
tradition, has a history of hidebound resistance to evolution.28  Consider, for 
instance, the “outlaw” brand29 applied to innovators of the game who 
suggested professional baseball was entertainment, such as Bill Veeck, 
former owner of the Chicago White Sox,30 or Charles O. Finley, former 
owner of the Oakland Athletics.31  Any fan can recall the outcry 
accompanying changes such as adding new franchises,32 moving 
franchises,33 ball and bat “juicing,”34 raising and lowering of the pitching 
mound,35 and even the abandonment of mid-calf hosiery in favor of long 
pants.36  Likely, three of the most controversial rule changes in modern 
professional baseball history are, the designated hitter,37 the addition of 
teams to the postseason playoffs leading to the World Series,38 and the 
 
 26. See, e.g., Steve Wulf, The Spit Hits the Fan, TIME, June 24, 2001, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,134797,00.html. 
 27. Some players are gifted with the capacity to alienate millions.  Consider the cases of Pete 
Rose, late of the Cincinnati Reds; Manny Ramirez, late of the Boston Red Sox and Los Angeles 
Dodgers—playing in 2011 with the Tampa Bay Rays—; or Barry Bonds, late of the San Francisco 
Giants.  Congressional investigations into baseball’s tolerance for substance abuse in 2005 and 2008 
resulted from the public outcry over the behavior of players in uncertain numbers.  See Lewie Pollis, 
Barry Bonds, Pete Rose and the Most Polarizing Figures in MLB Teams’ Histories, BLEACHER 
REPORT (June 7, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/725895-mlb-pete-rose-barry-bonds-and-
the-most-polarizing-figures-in-teams-histories#/articles/725895-mlb-pete-rose-barry-bonds-and-the-
most-polarizing-figures-in-teams-histories. 
 28. See Wolfe, Wright & Smart, supra note 5, at 115-16 (since Major League Baseball is 
tradition-bound, characterized by deep respect for convention and precedent, it has not changed 
much and is not prone to radical innovation; in short, the institution tends to reinforce the status 
quo). 
 29. ANDREW S. ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG 
BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 125 (1994) [hereinafter ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND 
BILLIONS]. 
 30. See BILL VEECK & ED LINN, VEECK—AS IN WRECK: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BILL 
VEECK 40-41, 105, 118-20, 126, 387 (1962). 
 31. See G. MICHAEL GREEN & ROGER D. LAUNIUS, CHARLIE FINLEY: THE OUTRAGEOUS STORY 
OF BASEBALL’S SUPER SHOWMAN 48 (2010). 
 32. POWERS, supra note 21, at 143-48, 336-40. 
 33. Id. at 124-31. 
 34. Id. at 123, 222-24.  See JASON TURBOW & MICHAEL DUCA, THE BASEBALL CODES: 
BEANBALLS, SIGN STEALING, & BENCH-CLEARING BRAWLS: THE UNWRITTEN RULES OF 
AMERICA’S PASTIME 187-91, 199-205 (2010). 
 35. WILLIAM F. MCNEIL, THE EVOLUTION OF PITCHING IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 1-2, 
121-22 (2006). 
 36. See POWERS, supra note 21, at 215, 221 (explaining that uniforms said to “look like 
pajamas”). 
 37. Id. at 222-24; see also GERALD W. SCULLY, THE BUSINESS OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
65-66, 202 n.21 (1989). 
 38. POWERS, supra note 21, at 253, 281. 
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banning fallout accompanying discovery of performance-enhancing drugs.39  
Albeit a traditions-based institution, social crises and cultural trends affect 
Major League Baseball (MLB)—including the clubs’ ownership groups—no 
differently than other institutions of more recent vintages.40 
Though the financial stakes of ownership and player compensation 
packages are astronomical,41 and some subset of the participants seem 
perpetually at odds, neither the stakes nor the controversies have cast the 
participants in rigid behavior patterns.  Indeed, some of the most creative 
problem-solving episodes in American business history have occurred 
within the confines of professional baseball, involving such issues as player 
contractual arrangements,42 trades among clubs attempting to improve team 
skill level, the image of the team as a representative of its home, or the 
 
 39. See, e.g., Paul D. Staudohar, Performance-Enhancing Drugs in Baseball, 56 LAB. L.J. 139 
(2005); JASON PORTERFIELD, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL: THE GREAT STEROID SCANDAL 6-15 
(2009).  Of course, the three true “revolutions” in the modern game of baseball were: (1) racial 
integration in the 1940s, see SCULLY supra note 37, at 172-74; (2) the introduction of free agency in 
the 1980s, id. at 37; and (3) the introduction of sabermetric measures—which are a system of 
mathematical models to evaluate a player’s potential that marked a departure of seismic magnitude 
from the convention of applying lifetimes of scouting experience and observational instinct—to 
player evaluations.  Brent C. Estes & N. Anna Shaheen, Determinants of Value and Productivity in a 
Complex Labor Market: How Sabermetrics and Statistical Innovation Changed the Business of 
Professional Baseball, 2 BUS. STUD. J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 27, 31, 43-45 (2010), available at 
http://www.alliedacademies.org/Publications/Papers/BSJ%20Vol%202%20SI%20No%201%202010
%20p%2027-48.pdf (last viewed Mar. 2, 2012).  These phenomena were reactions to, or reflections 
of, contemporary social conditions, not “manufactured” changes by the stakeholders to innovate the 
sport.  See also Burns, supra note 20.  Ken Burns weaves the history of baseball into the social and 
economic trends of America’s legacy in his PBS documentary on the game.  Id.  He recounts the 
Negro Leagues that provided separate and unequal opportunities for African-Americans, primarily in 
the 1920s through the 1940s.  Id.  As America changed, so did baseball.  See id.  In September 1945, 
five months after assuming office, President Harry S. Truman began the process of integrating the 
army; only a month later, Brooklyn Dodgers’ General Manager Branch Rickey signed Jackie 
Robinson to a professional contract.  See id. 
 40. For example, mass media reinforces culturally accepted notions about members of racial 
and ethnic groups, and baseball players are among those imprinted by the media with performance-
suitable “traits.”  See, e.g., David C. Ogden, The Welcome Theory: An Explanation for the 
Decreasing Number of African Americans in Baseball, NINTH ANN. CONF. POCPWI, Nov. 15, 2004, 
at 52-53. 
 41. See e.g., POWERS, supra note 21, at 264-68, 317 (television revenues); id. at 269-71 (team 
payrolls); id. at 276-77 (franchise values); see also ANDREW ZIMBALIST, MAY THE BEST TEAM WIN: 
BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 55-74 (2003) [hereinafter ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL 
ECONOMICS] (team profitability). 
 42. One illustration of such arrangements is player deferred compensation, especially in long-
term contracts.  See ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL ECONOMICS, supra note 41, at 113; see generally infra 
Part IV (describing the maneuvers in professional baseball). 
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economic viability of the franchise.43  The ability to transform a leisure 
activity’s competitive business model into a billion-dollar industry44 renders 
settlement of complex conflicts a value-added proposition.  A highly 
contentious and publicly exposed institution, like Major League Baseball, 
has bred creative problem solving via negotiating processes. 
Mediators may be assured that the thorniest controversies are penetrable 
to solution if properly framed45 and flexibly approached.46  The following 
describes approaches to that exercise; as well as, for the public, suggestions 
for evaluating mediator candidates beyond considering their backgrounds in 
the facilitation field.  There are four fundamental tools in addition to the 
essential tool of understanding the need to transform binary predisposition,47 
informing the thinking of the best mediators.  Proper mediator attitudes 
increase the likelihood of better outcomes in resolving a dispute’s 
underlying problems.48  These tools are traits the big-league mediator should 
feature in her game. 
III. FIRST MEDIATOR TOOL: DEFLECTS BINARY OUTLOOKS ON A 
CONTROVERSY 
A. Transitioning from Binary Thinking 
A discussion of binary thinking begins with the thinking mechanism 
itself, the brain.  The brain is segmented into two halves, the so-called “right 
brain” and “left brain,”49 each possessing unique qualities that, in some 
 
 43. Baseball has often been the pioneering sport when it comes to innovation and change in 
labor relations.  See Paul Staudohar & Pedro Garcia-del-Barrio, Have We Seen the Last of Baseball’s 
Labor Wars?, No. 0835 IASE CONF. PAPERS, June 2008.  Besides having the first players’ union, it 
was the first sport to introduce a strong, confrontational labor leader in Marvin Miller.  See id.  It 
was the first to have grievance arbitration.  See id.  Baseball made a major breakthrough in the form 
of player free agency.  See id.  It was the first to have a major work stoppage that interrupted the 
regular season.  See id.  Its pension system has always been on the cutting edge of professional 
sports.  See id.  Baseball is moving away from the conflict model toward a cooperative approach in 
which the interests of labor and management are joined.  See id. 
 44. See ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL ECONOMICS, supra note 41, at 55-74 (discussing franchises 
value rankings). 
 45. See Menkel-Meadow, Structure of Problem Solving, supra note 15, at 803-13, 840. 
 46. See id. at 815-29. 
 47. See infra Part III.A. 
 48. See Dean G. Pruitt & Steven A. Lewis, The Psychology of Integrative Bargaining, in 
NEGOTIATIONS: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 161, 169-70 (Daniel Druckman ed., 1977). 
 49. See Graham B. Strong, The Lawyer’s Left Hand: Nonanalytical Thought in the Practice of 
Law, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 759 (1998).  Strong’s work, while related to the ways of lawyerly thought, 
is eclipsed in comprehensiveness of description of hemispheric specializations by the work of 
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measure, would be wasted were it not for the collaborative activities of the 
other hemisphere.50 
Understanding human brain function highlights the contrast in two 
perspectives: One views conflict as a binary process of reductionism and 
analysis on the one hand, and the second sees conflict as problem-solving 
exercise requiring a holistic approach to achieve a resolution.51  Professor 
Graham Strong has explained, comprehensively, how brain function affects 
the lawyer’s worldview.52  The brain’s two hemispheres are joined together 
by a massive nerve fiber band, but are essentially identical in size and 
form.53  In function, they serve dissimilar yet harmonious purposes.54  The 
left hemisphere, sometimes called the left brain (supporting the view that the 
brain is two organs instead of a single organ), enables humans to divide 
spatial relationships between objects, rotate images in the mind, discern 
patterns in what appears to be a random array, and generate an image of a 
whole object from fragmented parts.55 
By contrast, the right hemisphere, or right brain, while vital to 
perception, is more abstruse in its cognitive value-added.56  Essentially, its 
function is critical in perceiving emotional nuances,57 in constructing a 
 
McGilchrist.  See MCGILCHRIST, THE DIVIDED BRAIN, supra note 14, at 137, 139.  The two 
hemispheres are not distinguished by what they do so much as by how they proceed with 
functioning, and the human brain is a mechanism that McGilchrist acknowledges is “a single, 
integrated, highly dynamic system.”  Id. at 34. 
 50. See Strong, supra note 49, at 764-74. 
 51. Id. at 773. 
 52. Id. at 759-60. 
 53. Id. at 764. 
 54. See id. at 764-74. 
 55. Id. at 771.  The right hemisphere sees the whole before it is broken into parts; thus, its 
holistic processing is not based on summing those parts.  Iain McGilchrist, Reciprocal Organization 
of the Cerebral Hemispheres, 12 DIALOGUES IN CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 503-15 (2010) 
[hereinafter McGilchrist, Reciprocal Organization], available at 
http://www.lifespanlearn.org/documents/2011Handouts/McGilchrist/McGilchrist_2%202.pdf.  That 
hemisphere’s understanding is based on complex pattern recognition as well, enabling holistic, or 
Gestalt, perception; here, truth corresponds with something other than itself.  Id.  See also 
MCGILCHRIST, THE DIVIDED BRAIN, supra note 14, at 4, 46, 193; MICHAEL SHERMER, THE 
BELIEVING BRAIN: FROM GHOSTS AND GODS TO POLITICS AND CONSPIRACIES 5, 72, 120-27, 206 
(2011) (explaining that the human brain, especially the right hemisphere, is hard-wired to detect 
patterns, even from meaningless data). 
 56. Strong, supra note 49, at 669. 
 57. Id. at 775.  This feature is of considerable weight for those who hold that emotions are 
vital components of decisions and choices, to be factored into the weighing of gains and losses that 
lead to accepting or rejecting offers.  See LEN FISHER, ROCK, PAPER SCISSORS: GAME THEORY IN 
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plausible and coherent narrative—and receiving the brain’s messages—, and 
“in the creative generation of hypotheses in the legal problem-solving 
process.”58  While the left brain is arguably of greater utility in one’s scoring 
well on the Law School Admission Test, however, especially in the logical 
reasoning and “games” sections, achieving a superior score without the input 
of the right brain is exceedingly unlikely.  The right brain’s creative 
generation of hypotheses for solving puzzles is key to their solution in the 
allotted time.  While the left brain may predominate in couching an 
argument that leads to dismissing an opposing party’s claims on the 
narrowest conceivable procedural grounds, that capacity alone does not 
guarantee ultimate resolution of the conflict environment. 
Additionally, the left brain is the portion that achieves reduction of 
phenomena, such as an array of facts or available arguments.59  In “high 
gear,” the left brain atomizes such phenomena into what Professor Menkel-
Meadow describes as definable, binary categories that admit of no interstitial 
alternatives except “null sets.”60  Parties in conflict see such strict 
dichotomies as fact versus law, plaintiffs versus defendants, Republicans 
versus Democrats, conservatives versus liberals, and so forth.61  Taken to 
ultimate lengths, one encounters the Manichean axis of good versus evil, and 
more pragmatically, the dichotomy of justice versus injustice.62  In this 
binary environment, parties determine whether to implement reconciliation 
or accommodation through either negotiation or adjudication according to 
how they understand the opposing position asserted by the adversary.63 
Identifying duality in opposition is the common manifestation of a 
binary thought process.64  Because humans tend to organize the real world 
by segregating ideas, forces, and parties into categories and camps, there is a 
 
EVERYDAY LIFE 123-24 (2008).  Fisher’s work is a basic primer on the essential principles of game 
theory that every person, earnestly engaged in facilitation whose practice requires a working 
knowledge of predicting outcomes, should read—essentially, all persons paid for being the neutral in 
facilitative processes.  Game theory is the interdisciplinary study of human behavior focusing on 
rational choices of strategies and treating direct interactions between and among individuals as if it 
were a game with known rules and payoffs and in which all participants are trying to win.  ROGER A. 
MCCAIN, GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE ANALYSIS OF STRATEGY 19 
(rev. ed. 2010). 
 58. Strong, supra note 49, at 775. 
 59. Id. at 771. 
 60. See Menkel-Meadow, Consensus Building, supra note 10, at 37, 39. 
 61. Id. at 50. 
 62. Id. at 39. 
 63. See id. at 39. 
 64. See id. at 39 (“There are two kinds of people in the world—those who divide things into 
two—and those who don’t.”). 
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corollary tendency to polarize.65  This fact, in combination with reduction of 
concepts into the most elementary issues, leads to the habit66 of focusing 
upon the most narrow point and ignoring the perspective and appreciation of 
the entire landscape of a dispute.67  With this thought process, one loses the 
capacity to integrate connected issues into an amalgam, defining a problem 
susceptible to solution.68 
This inclination to atomize is prevalent among litigation attorneys.69  
Consequently, parties poised in diametric opposition entails the convenient 
separation into camps of win or lose, minority and majority rules, litigate or 
settle, the whole pie or a defense verdict.70  Civil lawsuits and criminal 
prosecutions, however, are rarely binary-outcome events.71  The decision to 
participate in a joint solution of a problem is infused with the vagaries of 
predicting (1) future events, (2) whether the facts and decision points have 
 
 65. See generally id. 
 66.  See Margaret S. Herrman, Conclusion, in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF MEDIATION: 
BRIDGING THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 421, 424 (Margaret S. Herrman ed., 2006) (referring 
to the “reductionistic comforts of binary thinking”).  McGilchrist acknowledges the left brain’s 
special capacity to focus on isolated pieces of information.  See MCGILCHRIST, THE DIVIDED BRAIN, 
supra note 14, at 4.  He equates reductionism to disengagement, causing left-hemispheric “vision” to 
make people feel powerful and the reductionist “knowingly superior.”  Id. at 424. 
 67. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Structure of Problem Solving, supra note 15, at 784-89 
(assuming that only one issue exists enables a person’s neglect of other issues or needs of the 
remaining parties). 
 68. See id. at 788-89. 
 69. I was engaged in a real property transaction in the mid-2000s with a Harvard Law graduate 
who, determined to prove himself the smartest person in the room, ground every legal or business 
issue he debated to powder in the hope of finding the winning argument in the dust of minutiae.  The 
deal died, in large measure due to his efforts to have his camp’s position on each issue prevail and to 
the psychological weariness he promoted in every side’s negotiators.  I believe this to be a product of 
his relative inexperience in negotiation as much as his submission to left hemispheric function.  
McGilchrist observes that left-hemisphere thinking is essentially decontextualized; consequently, 
there is a tendency toward inflexible focus upon the internal logic of a situation, ignoring what 
experience teaches in the overall circumstances.  MCGILCHRIST, THE DIVIDED BRAIN, supra note 14, 
at 50.  See also McGilchrist, Reciprocal Organization, supra note 55, at 325.  The opposing party’s 
counsel had little sense of the flow of the negotiation, having transformed the discussion process—in 
his “mind”—into a series of static points or moments, see MCGILCHRIST, THE DIVIDED BRAIN, 
supra note 14, at 139; see McGilchrist, Reciprocal Organization, supra note 55, at 326, rather than 
into an endeavor to reach a cooperative solution in which the parties commit themselves to a 
coordinated choice of strategies, see MCCAIN, supra note 57, at 51, 54. 
 70. See Menkel-Meadow, Consensus Building, supra note 10, at 39. 
 71. Id. at 40, 43. 
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been correctly communicated to the principals, (3) the principals’ own biases 
and perceptions, and (4) predictions of the opposing side.72 
If facilitative processes are viewed as binary, then counsel representing 
the parties typically will think in terms of the need to listen to the other 
parties, to process and understand the “other side’s” information, and then to 
determine if “allowing my client to be persuaded through negotiation” or 
“moving the matter through adjudication” is the preferable course.73  
Professor Menkel-Meadow notes, hearing out the other stakeholders is 
falsely reductionist because some problems are not susceptible to identifying 
“winners” and “losers” at the conclusion of the conflict resolution vehicle.74 
The binary thought process fails to recognize that frequently grades, or 
degrees of correctness of views and percentages of outcome achievement, 
are part of any problem-solving process.75  Outcome achievement that is 
most productive is solution-based, not merely “assessment and dissection” 
based.76  Defending the narrowest of positions on atomized issues diverts the 
parties from satisfactory problem solving. 
 
 72. See Peter B. Friedman, Losing $500 Million Was a Legal Win: Outcomes and Predictions 
From a Lawyer’s Point-of-View, RULING IMAGINATION: LAW AND CREATIVITY BLOG (June 11, 
2010), http://blogs.geniocity.com/friedman/2010/06/losing-500-million-was-a-legal-win-outcomes-
and-predictions-from-a-lawyers-point-of-view/.  Dealing with such vagaries lies within the realm of 
right-hemispheric function, dealing with real world phenomena—as opposed to abstractions—, 
observing each thing in its context, in a qualifying relationship with its surroundings.  
MCGILCHRIST, THE DIVIDED BRAIN, supra note 14, at 49-50. 
 73. See Menkel-Meadow, Consensus Building, supra note 10, at 39. 
 74. Id. at 40.  The exercise of consensus building as joint problem solving requires, initially, 
refocusing the parties from the articulation of a personal grievance—the foe “screwed me”; the foe 
“deserved nothing different”—to the identification by each party, camp, or stakeholder of a problem.  
This centers the parties in resolving problems as contrasted with wounding.  First, therefore, the 
mediator must compel the foes to identify a problem without reference to the actions or purposes of 
the other side.  For instance, viewing the hypothetical in Part I, see supra pp. 98-99, the property 
owner must be guided to say, “My problem is that I cannot achieve the return on my investment [in a 
lot that was zoned commercially] if the property cannot be used for some commercial purpose”; 
while the municipality must be guided to say, “Our problem is that if we permit a parcel situated in 
the middle of a residential area to be used commercially, there is no consistency in the zoning 
ordinance’s application, and neighborhood disruption and public mistrust results.”  The second step 
is for the mediator to synthesize the articulated self-interested problems into a joint problem lending 
itself to a mutually acceptable, if not—to any foe—completely satisfying, solution.  In this instance, 
one plausible solution was the granting of certain zoning adjustment relief that would have permitted 
a non-permanent, quasi-commercial use of the parcel (in some jurisdictions known as a “home 
occupation”) while retaining the property’s residential zoning. 
 75. PAUL F. WILSON, LARRY D. DELL & GAYLORD F. ANDERSON, ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS: A 
TOOL FOR TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT 56, 89-90 (Jeanine L. Lau & Mary Beth Niles 
eds.,1993). 
 76. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Structure of Problem Solving, supra note 15, at 790 (illustrates 
an assessment strategy based on a “what the court might do at trial” risk-assessment).  See also 
Friedman, supra note 72, for an illustration of how the “loser” can win a significant victory in 
litigation.  Exxon won its litigation with the government by paying more than $507.5 million in 
12
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B. Surmounting the Barrier of Pragmatism: Destabilization and Game 
Theory 
Collaborative processes gain momentum when threats of legal action or 
other imminent crises to the stability of the existing order—such as natural 
calamities or regime change77—are taken seriously by opposing 
stakeholders.78  In the legal realm, these are referred to by some scholars as 
“legal destabilization rights.”79  Fear of the consequences of forthcoming 
regulatory implementation causing an unwanted change in business 
conditions80 is an illustration of events promoting the proper “crisis” 
mentality bringing stakeholders together to bargain. 
Historically, professional baseball management has invoked three such 
destabilization rights.  The first is the threat of contraction in the number of 
major league teams, attempted in both 2001 and 2006.81  On November 6, 
2001, the owners voted to eliminate two MLB teams, alleging that 
contraction—from thirty to twenty-eight teams—would materially help the 
finances of the remaining teams.82  The timing of the vote suggested, 
 
punitive damages, because the amount originally awarded against the corporation was $5 billion.  Id.  
The notion that Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008), represented a final 
pronouncement of defeat for the oil conglomerate misses the critical point of victory; rather, it 
established that maritime law’s upper limit for punitive damages is a 1:1 ratio to the awarded 
compensatory damages.  Id.  This represented a far greater triumph for the entire oil industry than 
the value of the damages paid by Exxon.  Id. 
 77. Altering an unsatisfactory status quo via pursuit of destabilizing goals is one tenet of 
recent American foreign policy.  See Stephen Sestanovich, American Maximalism, NAT’L. INT., Mar. 
1, 2005, at 13, 20-21. 
 78. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1020 (2004). 
 79. See id. at 1016. 
 80. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Getting to “Let’s Talk”: Comments on Collaborative 
Environmental Dispute Resolution Processes, 8 NEV. L.J. 835, 843 (2008) [hereinafter Menkel-
Meadow, Getting to “Let’s Talk”]. 
 81. See John T. Wolohan, Major League Baseball Contraction and Antitrust Law, 10 VILL. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 5, 5 (2003).  The year 2006 was a significant time because the Basic Agreement 
with the Major League Baseball Players Association expired after the 2006 season; that agreement 
contained a provision that obligated the players not to contest the contraction by no more than two 
teams, so long as the decision about the nature of the contraction was communicated by July 1, 2006.  
See Scott R. Rosner, The History and Business of Contraction in Major League Baseball, 8 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 265, 266 (2003). 
 82. See Wolohan, supra note 81, at 5.  That this threat was destabilizing to many is suggested 
by the outpouring of legal scholarship on the subject of contraction following the announcement, 
including the Symposium in Volume 10 of Villanova’s Sports and Entertainment Law Journal to 
13
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however, a different motivation by the owners.  The initial intention may 
have been to weaken the players’ union, while further attempting to compel 
cities to reconsider demands by the owners that there be municipal subsidies 
of baseball stadiums.83  The second destabilizing tactic is the threat of a 
player lockout.84  Finally, the third tactic is threatening franchise relocation 
in an effort to exact larger public subsidies from city governments and 
taxpayers.85 
Mediators not backed by governments have little power to bring about 
credible threats of material destabilization.86  They lack the power to 
introduce “urgency triggers,” to contemplate immediate joint problem 
solving—with a few exceptions.  One strategy that may bear fruit, by 
analogy, is urging the disputants to proceed with “baseball arbitration,” or 
final-offer arbitration as it is called in the dispute resolution practitioner 
community.87  Salary arbitration is one element of the Basic Agreement 
between the owners and the players’ union that mandates final-offer 
arbitration for players who complete three years of league service in Major 
League Baseball.88  Final-offer arbitration has the ability to deter entrenched 
positions on either side.89  Usually, the specter of possible failure compels 
 
which Professor Wolohan contributed his paper.  See generally id.  The contraction was 
controversial in many circumstances.  See POWERS, supra note 21, at 308-10. 
 83. ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS, supra note 29, at 136-40. 
 84. Of course, this threat is a double-edged sword because the players’ union also can threaten 
a strike.  Between 1972 and 1994-95, every round of negotiations between the owners and players 
produced either a strike or a lockout.  See Paul D. Staudohar, Baseball Negotiations: A New 
Agreement, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 2002, at 15-16. 
 85. See ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL ECONOMICS, supra note 41, 124. 
 86. Cf. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARA. L. REV. 1015, 1054, 1056 (2004) (once parties to a dispute have 
joined issues in litigation, only a limited range of interventions—whether an injunction or 
damages—are available to establish a “mandate” for resolution and those are outside the province of 
the mediator in private civil litigation). 
 87. See Amy Lok, Final-Offer Arbitration, 10 ADR BULL., no. 4, 2008 at 1-2, available at 
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1431&context=adr&sei-
redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fhl%3Den%26q%3DAmy%2
BLok%2Bfinal%2Boffer%26btnG%3DSearch%26as_sdt%3D1%252C3%26as_ylo%3D%26as_vis
%3D0#search=%22Amy%20Lok%20final%20offer%22. 
 88. See Basic Agreement art. VI, § F(1) (2007-2011), available at 
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf (agreement between the American League of 
Professional Baseball Clubs, National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, and Major League 
Baseball Players Association).  For background on the use of final offer arbitration in baseball, see 
ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS, supra note 29, at 82-83; SCULLY, supra note 37, at 161-65. 
 89. See Lok, supra note 87, at 1.  Baseball’s arbitration system is designed to encourage 
negotiation between the parties, and the system has had that effect.  See David J. Faurot & Stephen 
McAllister, Salary Arbitration and Pre-Arbitration Negotiation in Major League Baseball, 45 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 697, 701 (1992).  The baseball arbitrator has only twenty-four hours to 
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the parties to take their positions to a level of analysis characteristic of most 
early term and even mid-term dispute evaluations.90  Recent player contract 
negotiations suggest that owners, in an effort to avoid a hearing, continue to 
make players progressively more lucrative offers in the days and hours 
closely preceding the time of the hearing.91 
If the mediator encourages a swift resolution, coupled with the certainty 
of exposure, the parties in all likelihood will move instead toward more 
realistic positions in joint problem solving.  Pushing for final-offer 
arbitration motivates negotiation-type processes; under the threat of 
destabilization, stakeholders are forced to at least consider whether they 
actually believe the positions they are asserting in a more quantitative, less 
emotional way.92 
Mediators will seldom have destabilization as a “weapon” against binary 
thinking; however, a less stressful approach is applying a select number of 
principles of game theory to these parties’ polarized positions.  The mediator 
must prevent the foes from escalating the conflict by directing them from a 
 
choose one of the offers made for the player’s salary, and the club and player have only one hour 
apiece to present evidence, creating a high-stakes urgency for the hearing itself.  See id. at 698-99. 
 90. See SCOTT R. ROSNER & KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 376 (2d ed. 
2011) (salary arbitration typically increases player compensation above its prior level and results in 
more realistic offers being produced). 
 91. See Ken Peters, Ethier, Dodgers Reach Agreement, AZCENTRAL.COM (Feb. 17, 2009, 1:41 
PM), http://www.azcentral.com/sport/diamondbacks/cactus/articles/2009/02/17/20090217spt-ethier-
dodgers-reach-agreemeent (club and player delayed the time of the arbitration hearing so the sides 
could continue to negotiate in the antechamber of the hearing room).  One theory often repeated for 
the owners’ conduct in last minute contract concessions is that salary arbitration is a process with 
great likelihood for spoiling the atmosphere on the team because the owner’s representatives must 
argue to the arbitrator in detail about the inferior value of the player, implicitly denigrating the 
talent—inherent worth—of the player.  See id.  Ironically, this form of dispute resolution is binary in 
that the neutral party accepts only one of the two opinions of value without adopting a middle 
ground.  See supra Part III.  In January 2012, the sides again avoided arbitration by ageing to a one-
year, $10.95 million contract after he was paid $9.25 million in 2011.  See Andre Ethier Re-Signs 
with Los Angeles Dodgers for One-Year, $10.95 Million Deal, AZCENTRAL.COM (Jan. 17, 2012 1:12 
PM), http://www.azcentral.com/sports/diamondbacks/articles/2012/01/17/20120117andre-ethier-re-
signs-los-angeles-dodgers-one-year-million-deal.html. 
 92. A more mathematical assessment, based on Nash bargaining solutions premised on a Nash 
Equilibrium, is found in Faurot & McAllister, supra note 89, at 701-04.  The authors conclude that 
for best results, the player should reveal risk-neutral preferences when bargaining will yield the Nash 
Solution based on the revealed preferences.  Id. at 710.  The Nash Solution posits that where any 
finite resource is to be divided, rational participants will choose a division of the resource that 
maximizes the product of their utility functions.  See FISHER, supra note 57, at 120. 
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posture of “tit-for-tat,”93 a conditional cooperative strategy based on threat 
of reprisal, toward a more broadly cooperative “I’ll scratch your back if you 
do likewise” duality based on reciprocity of good will.94  Game theory95 
affords insights into the evolution of cooperation, but in the process, it issues 
two challenges to the facilitative process participants.  The first is how the 
participants can reach coordinated agreements.96  The second is devising a 
means to compel coordinating persons to remain loyal, cooperative members 
of the group, while sticking to their agreements.97 
The dilemma of non-cooperating persons can be summarized by 
assessing the Nash equilibrium.98  This equilibrium is the consequence of 
 
 93. See FISHER, supra note 57, at 155-83.  A player using a tit-for-tat strategy initially 
cooperates with the other player and thereafter copies the strategy that second player uses on a prior 
move in an “alternating turns” mode.  ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 36-39, 
113-20, 136-37 (1984).  Thus, a player cooperates and continues to do so as long as there is 
reciprocity from the other player.  Id.  The tit-for-tat strategist thus is never the first to “defect,” but 
the player will respond to defection with a counter defection.  Id.  The ultimate expression of tit-for-
tat in baseball is known as pitcher retaliation.  See TURBOW & DUCA, supra note 34, at 97-131; Nick 
Piecoro, MLB Suspends Arizona Diamondbacks Manager Kirk Gibson, Reliever Esmerling Vasquez, 
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, June 7, 2011, 
http://www.azcentral.com/sports/diamondbacks/articles/2011/06/07/20110607arizona-
diamondbacks-manager-kirk-gibson-reliever-esmerling-vasquez-suspended.html#ixzz1OnJ2ELyx. 
 94. See FISHER, supra note 57, at 9. 
 95. Game theory is felicitously defined as a scientific “guide to decision making that gives us 
pointers to what is really going on,” by “imposing logical discipline on the stories we tell.”  See id. at 
122. 
 96. See id. at 31. 
 97. See id. at 23, 60. 
 98. See id. at 23-29.  Consider the following baseball illustration of applied game theory 
involving the classic duel between a pitcher and base runner over advancing from first to second or 
second to third base by “stealing” the base—beating the application to the runner of a “tag” by the 
fielder of the ball.  The base runner presses for advantage, attempting to distract the pitcher with a 
“lead” off the base, like a sideways-scuttling crab darting out of and back into his hole.  The pitcher, 
Catfish, changes his delivery to the stretch and demonstrates his best pick-off moves, forcing the 
runner to dive back to first.  The base runner, Maury, has two alternative strategies: to run or to 
remain on base.  The pitcher has two choices: to throw to first—in attempt to pick the runner off—or 
not.  Of course neither does exclusively one or the other all the time.  They randomize their actions 
to keep the opponent guessing.  In fact, some baseball statisticians hold that pitchers and runners 
have randomized their play such that the probability of the runner reaching second is exactly 
balanced in the case the runner attempts to steal or not.  Otherwise, the pitcher or the runner is not 
playing optimally.  Imagine if the probability of reaching second were higher if Maury did not 
attempt to steal.  Here, his best play is to not attempt to steal because it maximizes his chance of 
reaching second.  Knowing that, Catfish’s best play is not to try to pick him off—which runs the risk 
of throwing the ball away, letting Maury reach second with ease.  But if Catfish is not going to 
attempt a pickoff, Maury should attempt to steal.  But if Catfish knows Maury will attempt to steal, 
he will try to pick him off, and so anticipation reciprocates.  This is not equilibrium.  A similar 
argument assumes that the probability of reaching second is higher if the runner attempts to steal.  In 
game theory terms, there is no pure strategy solution (that is, Nash equilibrium) for either player.  
Neither Maury nor Catfish can do just one thing all the time, and neither can assume the other will 
16
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol12/iss1/3
[Vol. 12: 97, 2012]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
113 
two sides having selected a strategy that neither side can then deviate from 
without ending up in a less desirable position.99  So long as both sides act 
only to advance their own interests, the Nash equilibrium continues to trap 
the parties.  If a negotiated resolution is not of Nash equilibrium, one or both 
sides can improve their position by breaking the cooperative agreement—
sometimes called “defecting” or “cheating.”  However, when a negotiated 
agreement is of Nash equilibrium, both sides will lose their advantage if they 
decide to defect.100  The mediator who applies game theory must persuade 
each side that the perceived incentive to defect—the possibility of doing 
better by breaking the cooperative agreement—has been eliminated.101  So 
persuaded, the parties will behave in a manner such that the negotiated 
settlement will last. 
 
do one thing all the time.  Both must play a mixed strategy of randomizing between the two 
alternatives.  It is illogical for the optimal random mixes of the two players over their respective 
strategies to give rise to a probability of success for one choice higher than the probability of success 
for another.  Once you make such an assumption, you get caught in the loop of indecision.  Such is a 
fundamental truth in game theory.  The probable payoff for each of the pure strategies—attempt to 
steal, not attempt to steal; make a pickoff throw, no pickoff throw—that are mixed together by a 
player must be equal.  The probability Maury will reach second if he attempts to steal must equal the 
probability he will reach second if he does not attempt a steal.  However, that does not mean Catfish 
should ignore Maury, which would be equivalent to Catfish playing the pure strategy of not making 
any pickoff throws to first.  We know from above that a pure strategy cannot be optimal.  The only 
way optimal (Nash equilibrium) play is achieved is if Catfish plays the mixed strategy that all 
pitchers play—throw to first base with some frequency strictly greater than zero and strictly less than 
one.  See Austin Frakt, The Game (Theory) Within the Game, THE INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Aug. 
24, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/the-game-theory-within-the-
game/. 
 99. See FISHER, supra note 57, at 18.  The Nash equilibrium posits that each participant will 
select a strategy that is optimal for participation given the fact that other “players” are doing 
likewise.  John F. Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155, 155-62 (1950).  Of 
course, game theory’s fundamental assumption is that decision makers are rational actors pursuing 
their respective self interests with the expectation that the other actors are similarly motivated.  See 
AXELROD, supra note 93, at vii. 
 100. FISHER, supra note 57, at 29. 
 101. Id. at 83. 
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IV. SECOND MEDIATOR TOOL: TRANSFORMS ZERO-SUMMING 
INTO JOINT PROBLEM-SOLVING 
A. Converts Parties’ Perspectives from Winning and Losing 
Mediators must get the parties past their tendencies to interpret the 
world in binary oppositions.  This can be accomplished by illustrating to the 
parties that participating in the dispute problem-solving process does not 
mean solely choosing between cooperating and “going for broke” in an 
adjudication proceeding.  Additionally, the facilitator must minimize the 
tendency to see issues as limited in number or as reducible to finite, discreet 
parts.  Instead, the facilitator presents a vision of complementary desires that 
allows the parties to share resources and opportunities.102  Moving forward, 
the facilitator understands that more trades between or among the 
stakeholders allows more solutions to emerge.103  Moreover, the facilitator 
must minimize the narrow view that parties are battling over thereby 
preventing a joint resolution.104 
To encourage abandonment of win-lose binary perspectives as well as 
the “win-win” bias, the facilitator must provide an accurate description of 
how joint problem solving may produce “better than” outcomes.105  In this 
regard, the apt analogy is the trade of MLB players in which a deal makes 
sense for both teams rather than one side getting the better of the other.106  
Indeed, an arm’s length trade is not a zero-sum operation.107  J.C. Bradbury, 
a leading baseball economist, discourages the view that one team bests the 
other in each player trade: “Rather than trying to identify winners and losers, 
it’s best to first try to understand why the trade happened. . . .  Most times I 
find that deals make sense for both sides, as economic theory predicts.  
Mistakes happen, but as a general rule, all parties to trades are winners.”108 
 
 102. See Menkel-Meadow, Getting to “Let’s Talk”, supra note 80, at 849. 
 103. See Menkel-Meadow, Consensus Building, supra note 10, at 43. 
 104. See id. at 48-49. 
 105. See Menkel-Meadow, Getting to “Let’s Talk”, supra note 80, at 839-40. 
 106. See generally J.C. BRADBURY, HOT STOVE ECONOMICS: UNDERSTANDING BASEBALL’S 
SECOND SEASON (2011). 
 107. See id. at 18. 
 108. BRADBURY, supra note 106, at 19.  Bradbury’s observation is a reasoned summary of how, 
if team’s managements cooperate and communicate their intentions with each other, each trading 
“partner” has the potential to improve its lot in the long run.  Id.  See also AXELROD, supra note 93, 
at 122-23. 
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B. Persuades the Stakeholders to Communicate and to Coordinate Their 
Strategies 
Mutual benefit is a reasonable expectation for parties in transaction 
negotiations.  In dispute negotiations, a more realistic expectation may 
simply be to improve communication between the parties in negotiations.109  
The mediator’s task is persuading the stakeholders that ongoing 
communication and coordination of strategies will produce greater 
satisfaction and a fairer outcome; additionally, such a process heightens the 
likelihood of voluntary compliance with the final agreement.110 
Communication is key to negotiating coordinated strategies.111  
However, to enable constituent members to coordinate strategies, the 
communication must be directed toward establishing coalitions.112  When 
strategies are coordinated among stakeholders, potential cooperative 
solutions rise to the surface of the negotiations.113  If the adversaries can 
arrive at a cooperative solution, any nonconstant sum game is convertible to 
a win-win scenario.114  In the Pareto optimal state,115  a solution, or series of 
solutions, to a conflict can be derived by the negotiating parties and 
facilitator, thereby rendering each party as well off as possible without 
 
 109. See Menkel-Meadow, Consensus Building, supra note 10, at 42-43. 
 110. See id. at 53. 
 111. See FISHER, supra note 57, at 75. 
 112. See id. at 113.  A dominant strategy equilibrium, where each participant in the game has a 
dominant strategy, is a noncooperative equilibrium in which no player coordinates his choice of 
strategies; instead, participants commit themselves to a coordinated choice of strategies whereby, 
those chosen strategies constitute a cooperative equilibrium.  MCCAIN, supra note 57, at 54-56. 
 113. See FISHER, supra note 57, at 113.  See also MCCAIN, supra note 57, at 51, 54. 
 114. See FISHER, supra note 57, at 113. 
 115. Pareto efficiency is named for Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian economist who studied economic 
efficiency and income distribution.  See Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying 
Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1215 n.14 (1991).  Pareto posited that a different allocation of 
resources among a set of individuals that makes at least one individual better off without making any 
other individual worse off is called a Pareto Improvement; and, Pareto optimality—or efficiency—is 
the state where no further Pareto Improvements are possible.  Id. at 1211, 1216-17, 1234-35.  “Better 
off” means being put in a preferred position to the one just previously occupied by an individual.  Id.  
And “not worse off” allows for the compensation for a loss while retaining an efficiency gain to be 
realized by others, although it is theorized by economists that the party “not worse off” is not fully 
compensated for their loss at times.  Id.  One of Pareto’s chief critics as applied to the realm of legal 
disputes is Guido Calabresi, who rejects the notion of Pareto optimality.  Id. 
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inflicting unnecessary harm to the other disputants.116  Pareto optimization is 
the economists’ way of describing the ideal state following the parties’ joint 
implementation of strategies for minimally effective cooperation.117  
Minimally effective cooperation is efficient when there is no alternative 
arrangement of strategies allowing one or more persons to be better off in 
their particular circumstances without the other parties’ circumstances 
worsening.118 
V. THIRD MEDIATOR TOOL: NEUTRALIZES NAY-SAYERS AND 
ENGENDERS STAKEHOLDER TRUST 
A.  Sometimes You Have to Run the Bum 
Two of the most winningest managers in Major League Baseball history 
are Earl Weaver119 and Bobby Cox.120  Likely not a coincidence, these 
passionate leaders were also the managers most frequently ejected from 
games.121  This no doubt stemmed from a passion for their team’s advantage 
in the game overcoming their reason at some moment.  Therefore, when the 
umpires—charged with keeping order and forward momentum—sensed that 
having them continue in their managerial roles would be unproductive, the 
only solution was an early managerial exit where their protests and negative 
attitudes could not stymie the contest’s progress.122  The productivity of the 
belligerent’s participation, in this context, had ceased. 
Similarly, mediators are occasionally confronted by parties who neither 
seek a solution to a joint problem nor respect the problem-solving method, 
but instead remain stuck in a binary state or adopt a posture solely for the 
 
 116. Id. at 1216-17.  See also HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 139 
(1982). 
 117. See FISHER, supra note 57, at 117. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See SCULLY, supra note 37, at 189-90. 
 120. See ED RANDALL, BASEBALL FOR THE UTTERLY CONFUSED 97 (2010); SCULLY, supra 
note 37, at 189-90. 
 121. RANDALL, supra note 120, at 217. 
 122. Of course, umpires have egos and upper limits to their tolerance for verbal and other 
abuse, and sometimes they have bad days.  Even so, umpires are trained to give players and 
managers certain latitude, so long as their conduct does not indicate an intention to disrupt the 
proceedings with childlike acting out.  The fans are at the game to witness the acts of the players and 
managers, even their antics, as opposed to those of the mediator, a fact worth recalling by the 
umpires.  See Crooked Umpires?, BASEBALL FEVER (last visited Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://www.baseball-fever.com/archive/index.php/t-56683.html. 
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purpose of wounding their opponents.123  Agreed mediation may suggest a 
joint desire for problem solving; however, an agenda by one stakeholder’s 
representative may preclude finding a solution.124  If that individual, like an 
enraged baseball manager, is so incensed by perceived injustice or genuinely 
believes himself the control party or the “smartest person in the room,” the 
interests of the stakeholders may best be served by excluding that individual 
from the proceedings.125  The mediator, contemplating such action, needs to 
understand the purpose of that individual’s participation, especially whether 
that individual—whom I call, for convenience, the “consigliere”—is the 
fundamental decision maker for that stakeholder.126  If the mediator does not 
have such authority, he will need acquiescence in “running” or ejecting the 
consigliere, unless the consigliere is a milquetoast, cowed by the mediator’s 
strength of personality.127 
Running the consigliere is a delicate art indeed.  The decision maker 
may erroneously believe that his consigliere is valuable, either as a “bad 
cop” or “trusted advisor.”128  Perhaps the decision maker believes the 
consigliere influences the results of the problem-solving discussions because 
opponents perceive him as formidable, a menacing force that refuses to 
capitulate to the other stakeholder’s demands.129  Perhaps the decision maker 
genuinely relies on the views of the consigliere or believes him to have 
particular expertise in the subject matter of the dispute.130  However, if the 
mediator is too insistent on excluding the consigliere from deliberations, the 
mediator’s intentions may be read as reflecting bias, negatively impacting 
problem-solving momentum.131  But if the mediator’s instinct is that 
 
 123. See WILSON, DELL & ANDERSON, supra note 75, at 55; see generally THE NEGOTIATOR’S 
FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR (Andrea Kupfer Schneider 
& Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006) [hereinafter THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK]. 
 124. See generally THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK, supra note 123. 
 125. See generally id. 
 126. See generally id. 
 127. See generally id. 
 128. See David F. Sally & Kathleen M. O’Connor, Negotiating in Teams, in THE 
NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 547, 549-
50 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006) (discussing the good cop/bad 
cop tactic). 
 129. See generally THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK, supra note 123. 
 130. See generally id. 
 131. See Roy J. Lewicki, Trust and Distrust, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK: THE DESK 
REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 191, 191-99 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & 
Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006). 
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progress is essentially being stymied by continuing involvement of the 
consigliere, there is little to lose by recommending either the consigliere take 
his leave or, alternatively, the consigliere be assigned another task—for 
example, modeling some settlement scenarios or mining additional facts—
that requires his separation from immediate participation in the 
conference.132 
The obstreperous lawyer for a stakeholder presents a difficult quandary 
for the mediator.133  A lawyer may not be acclimated to the environment of 
collaborative conversations directed toward problem solving, and therefore 
may lack faith in the process.134  The mediator must accept that an 
innovative approach to problem solving threatens those having a vested 
interest in maintaining the status quo, and that vested interest may run so 
deep as to override technical rationality.135  The mediator’s innovative 
approach may be perceived as a threat to the lawyer’s traditional skill set and 
even the job security of the well-seasoned lawyer used to the fact-finding 
process of discovery and trial cross-examination.136  Further, a lawyer with a 
competitive personality may feel superior to the mediator based on 
 
 132. The author during one negotiation ordered a representative of his own client to be silent 
and to remain so for the balance of the meeting and stared down the representative, challenging him 
to defy his directive.  The client’s representative broke off the mutual stare, sulking instead in a 
corner of the conference room.  The decision maker for the other camp was sufficiently impressed 
by the fact that an opposing camp member recognized the negative inputs of his opponents’ 
consigliere that he became convinced of the other representatives’ sincere intentions to resolve 
problems.  This confidence building enabled a settlement in principle to be reached in under ten 
minutes following the author’s confrontation with the consigliere.  Every person in the room reached 
the judgment that the consigliere was determined to keep the pot stirred and productive negotiations 
stymied.  Decision makers who are experienced in business matters know their personnel and what 
each contributes to problem-solving processes; however, at times they simply have to be reminded 
of these persons’ capacities.  Likewise, the mediator has to be careful to differentiate between a 
party’s intention to make trouble and inability to articulate his point.  This is not so difficult a 
diagnosis, scientists estimate that over ninety percent of communication between humans is 
nonverbal—whether through body language, vocal intonation, or otherwise.  MCGILCHRIST, THE 
DIVIDED BRAIN, supra note 14, at 106.  Verbal and physical explosions occurring in negotiations 
may be the consigliere’s expressions of a desire to dominate the proceedings by aggressive 
manipulation where reason will be unavailing. 
 133. See generally THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK, supra note 123. 
 134. See Gale Miller & Robert Dingwall, When the Play’s in the Wrong Theater, in THE 
NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 47, 53 
(Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006).  The authors note that attorneys 
can create impediments to conflict resolution by insisting that clients conform to the attorneys’ 
preferred orientation, citing the work of sociologist Joseph Hopper.  Id. (citing Joseph Hopper, 
Contested Selves in Divorce Proceedings, in INSTITUTIONAL SELVES: TROUBLED IDENTITIES IN A 
POSTMODERN WORLD, 127, 127-41 (Jaber F. Gubrium & James A. Holstein eds., 2001). 
 135. See Wolfe, Wright & Smart, supra note 5, at 115. 
 136. Cf. Wolfe, Wright & Smart, supra note 5, at 115-16. 
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experience in practice;137 command of the dispute’s immediate facts; or 
another, less relevant criterion.  The lawyer may feel she has an equal or 
more valid notion of what just resolution of the joint problem entails.  
However, while this may be a legitimate posture for the lawyer, having such 
a view is very different from actually employing game-playing maneuvers to 
block any problem-solving result.138 
A variety of approaches are useful in these conditions.  First, it is 
necessary for the mediator to address the principals at least as intently as 
their advocates, reflecting the appropriate deference to the real decision 
makers.139  Therefore, it is beneficial to remind counsel, clearly bent on 
blocking progress, that further retarding a resolution when the principal has 
expressed a desire to settle is a breach of the lawyer’s ethical obligations.140  
Respectfully driving this point home to recalcitrant counsel may lubricate 
the facilitative process.  Another technique for disarming obstreperous 
counsel is for the mediator to subtly make the point that he is willing to 
share ownership of proffered solutions but not authorship of them; thus, the 
solutions presented are not subject to revocation by counsel without the prior 
direct input of his principal’s leadership.141  Finally, the mediator may need 
to remind counsel that, while “wounding” the adversary is well suited to a 
criminal justice process, the ambition of mediation is to resolve a jointly-
owned problem by addressing a need of some immediacy. 
 
 137. It is fairly common in the first hour of the facilitative process for the seasoned advocate to 
advise the assembly that he has years of experience in litigating matters of the type subject to the 
facilitation.  See Robert H. Mnookian, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the 
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235, 242 (1993) (Professor Robert Mnookian 
would characterize this circumstance as a form of a “principal/agent problem,” a misalignment of the 
incentives of the agent with the principal’s interests). 
 138. See Christopher Honeyman, Understanding Mediators, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S 
FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 581, 589 (Andrea Kupfer 
Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006). 
 139. Cf. HILARY ASTOR & C.M. CHINKIN, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AUSTRALIA 99 (1992) 
(failure to engage real decision makers in the mediation talks may jeopardize the results). 
 140. See, e.g., ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT §41:910 (2010) (cases 
discussing Ethical Rule 1.2, the lawyer’s obligation to abide by client’s decision whether to settle a 
matter). 
 141. The distinction between ownership and authorship is illustrated in DWIGHT GOLANN, 
MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR NEUTRALS AND ADVOCATES 240 (2009). 
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B.  Engaging Parties in Trust Building 
Game theorists suggest that human nature causes people to adopt a risk-
dominant strategy142 rather than a payoff-dominant strategy where the 
ultimate reward drives the person to maximize that reward.143  To optimize 
the reward, however, members of a camp—especially in multiparty 
disputes—must first change their beliefs about what their foes may 
attempt.144  The whole challenge to cooperation requires: (1) a change in 
belief, (2) causing a group to change this belief in a coordinated manner, and 
(3) persuading those “new believers” to adhere immutably to their beliefs.145 
Inevitably, some semblance of trust becomes imperative in the payoff-
dominant strategy.146  Genuine trust among adversaries is scarce.147  In its 
place, game theorists advise using credible commitment as a totem.148  
Credible commitment requires each party to commit to a cooperative 
agreement in a fashion that engenders belief in the commitment even if there 
is inherent mistrust between the co-makers of the agreement.149  Game 
theorists suggest two fundamental means by which a party may demonstrate 
credible commitment without underlying trust.150  The parties in either 
instance will limit their options to defect from the cooperative agreement in 
an overt and transparent manner.151  One possibility includes changing the 
reward structure so that it becomes too costly for parties to back out later.152  
Another method entails restructuring the party’s future options, thereby 
effectively eliminating alternatives so that agreed-upon cooperation cannot 
 
 142. “Risk-dominant” describes a strategy designed to achieve a Nash equilibrium that 
implicates the least risk to the strategist.  See FISHER, supra note 57, at 88.  In risk-dominant 
strategies, the “winning” position is for parties to defect from or “cheat” under the agreement 
reached.  See MCCAIN, supra note 57, at 51-52.  A “dominant strategy” generally refers to one 
dominating all other strategies for a particular player in the game, because it is the best response to 
any strategy that the other player(s) may choose.  Id. 
 143. See FISHER, supra note 57, at 88.  Here, the Nash equilibrium and winning position 
implicate joint cooperation.  Id. 
 144. See id. at 89. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 133. 
 147. See, e.g., AARON M. HOFFMAN, BUILDING TRUST: OVERCOMING SUSPICION IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 2, 139 (James N. Rosenau & Russell Stone eds., 2006) (barriers to 
trusting relationships among rivals are high). 
 148. FISHER, supra note 57, at 136. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 136-37. 
 151. See id. at 7, 137, 196. 
 152. Id. at 137.  For example, a party can place itself in a position where its reputation will be 
damaged.  See id. at 137, 196. 
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later be reneged.153  Additionally, a party may also gain trust by showing 
altruism and generosity toward the foe without any accompanying 
expectation of reciprocity.154  Game theorists hold that the circle of trust is 
best entered into by offering trust without expecting it in return.155 
VI. FOURTH MEDIATOR TOOL: INCITES MAXIMUM OPTIONS  FOR 
TRADES 
Consensus-seeking negotiations tend to focus on identifying and 
addressing the vital, underlying needs of the stakeholders; whereas, the 
adversarial viewpoint tends to entrench parties in arguments and “position 
statements.”156  This difference is reflected by the inclination of stakeholders 
to search for additional resources or new concepts for problem solving as 
opposed to focusing on the adversarial division of limited available 
resources.157  Therefore, the stakeholders—who may consist of parties to an 
adjudicative action as well as “real parties in interest” immediately affected 
by an adjudicative result—will raise a number of related issues in search of a 
resolution.158  That is a positive circumstance because, as game theory 
suggests, more issues increase the likelihood of greater satisfaction in 
outcomes due to the fact that more complementary trades are possible.159  
Complementary desires are met by the possibility of complementary trades, 
thereby promoting multiple solutions by which to share resources so as to 
meet the vital interests of the highest number of stakeholders.160 
The successful mediator encourages stakeholders to articulate their 
complementary desires, identify linkages between what initially appears—
prior to the application of the left-brain abductive skill sets—to be irrelevant 
 
 153. Id. at 137, 196.  See also id. at 140-42 (describing means of cutting off one’s “escape 
routes”). 
 154. Id. at 142. 
 155. Id. at 151.  Thus, the risk–reward analysis is losing out to an untrustworthy foe versus 
gaining reciprocal trust.  One’s vital interests can be compromised if trust is misplaced.  See Yan Ki 
Bonnie Cheng, Power and Trust in Negotiation and Decision-Making: A Critical Evaluation, HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. (Sept. 1, 2009), available at http://www.hnlr.org/?p=207. 
 156. See Menkel-Meadow, Consensus Building, supra note 10, at 41-43. 
 157. Id. at 43; see also Cheng, supra note 155 (explaining that trust offers “integrative 
potential,” supporting collaborative efforts to “expand the pie”). 
 158. See Menkel-Meadow, Consensus Building, supra note 10, at 43. 
 159. See id. at 43. 
 160. This is an expression of George Homans’ theory of complementary needs.  See id. at 43 
(citing GEORGE C. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS (1974).). 
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and disconnected issues, and recognize mutual interdependence in the 
process of consensus building.161  In this environment, creative solutions can 
surface as viable alternatives for concrete applications.162  Professional 
baseball provides a helpful illustration of certain complementarities between 
organizations and how resources can be shared.163 
A.  The Multiparty Trade: Engaging Outside Parties’ Assets 
The essence of baseball player trading is the continual fluidity of the 
personnel marketplace.164  As one baseball commentator notes—comparing 
the trading market in players to the securities market—adaptability of a 
team, seeking to improve its human capital, to the roiling marketplace is the 
key to satisfying outcomes.165  Baseball trades involving three teams date 
back to the 1950s but became commonplace in the 1990s when the era of 
inflated player contracts and agonizing salary arbitration created an incentive 
for teams to jettison players with unaffordable contracts.166  In order to 
soften the affect of absorbing contract costs, among other reasons, two teams 
desiring to exchange assets to improve overall player quality will involve a 
third team to help share the overall transaction costs.167 
Initially, in order to improve the value of a team’s roster, its vital 
interests and needs are identified by the team’s management.168  Of course, 
each team’s core assets cannot be sacrificed, while the other team’s assets 
alone may not meet the vital interests of the initiating team.169  
Consequently, the two teams that envision a bargain look for solutions by 
engaging a third team.170  For instance, when one team attempts to offload a 
player’s substantially high salary, in order for such a deal to be 
consummated, involvement of a third team, which has the ability to absorb 
the salary of the “expensive player,” enables the initial two teams to 
 
 161. See Menkel-Meadow, Getting to “Let’s Talk”, supra note 80, at 849. 
 162. Id. at 849. 
 163. See infra Part VI.A–D. 
 164. See SCULLY, supra note 37, at 182-90. 
 165. See LEWIS, supra note 5, at 190-91, 212. 
 166. See SCOTT BARZILLA, THE STATE OF BASEBALL MANAGEMENT: DECISION-MAKING IN 
THE BEST AND WORST TEAMS 1993-2003, 31-32, 74-75, 169, 207, 231 (2004) (explaining that since 
free agency, many trades are informed less by value of new players added to the team than desire to 
“offload” salaries of nonessential players). 
 167. See id. at 31-32. 
 168. See SCULLY, supra note 37, at 182, 186. 
 169. See FISHER, supra note 57, at 184-87. 
 170. See id. 
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complete their transaction by exchanging with team three less costly players 
and using their contracts as the medium of exchange.171 
Looking for solutions outside the immediate parties’ control may make 
solving a joint problem achievable by including third party participation.172  
This actually is a familiar approach in a variety of legal settlement 
postures.173  In some personal injury cases, the individual plaintiff may be 
unable to reach a settlement with the defendant without his medical 
lienholders reducing their claims for payment.174  All elements of a 
settlement may not reside exclusively in compensation from the direct 
adversary; thus, third parties may need to be included in the problem-solving 
conversation.175  In the non-party-at-fault circumstances, instead of plaintiff 
and defendant sharing the binary thought-grounded conviction that they are 
each liable only to a particular degree, the parties accept that others may 
bear a certain degree of responsibility for which their assets may enable 
reaching a joint resolution.176 
Reference to cash or other “standard” forms of compensation is at times 
short sighted.  Returning to the aforementioned City versus office building 
owner meditation hypothetical,177 the office building owner’s property was 
rezoned with insufficient notice.  While the insufficiency of the notice would 
ultimately prove to be of minimal substance—the City could have noticed 
the hearing properly and ultimately have taken identical rezoning action—, 
the parties failed in their negotiations to address the possibility that the City 
could agree to certain zoning adjustments permitting the owner to use the 
building commercially without incurring a “spot-zoning” dilemma.  
Consider another illustration involving a surveyor who commits a substantial 
error in a subdivision survey.  The owners discover that improvements of 
five neighbors within the six-lot subdivision are constructed across property 
boundaries, resulting in abundant, mutual encroachments.  The binary 
thought process requires claims against the affected title insurance 
underwriters, the surveyor’s errors and omissions carrier, the residential 
 
 171. BARZILLA, supra note 166, at 31-32. 
 172. FISHER, supra note 57, at 184-87. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Bill Daniels, On Dealing with Lien Claimants, CAALA LAS VEGAS CONVENTION 
SYLLABUS, Sept. 2001, available at http://www.billdanielslaw.com/docs/On-Dealing-with-Lien-
Claimants.htm. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See supra pp. 98-99. 
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contractors, and the lot owners.  In litigating fault and compensatory 
damages, the risk of destroying goodwill in the neighborhood via suits and 
countersuits for trespass, quiet title, damages for improvements’ restoration, 
and loss of investment value looms large.  The left-handed facilitator instead 
engages these parties, including the municipality’s development branch, in a 
conversation to re-plot the subdivision so that neighbors can swap pieces of 
their lots, while maintaining roughly equal lot square footages; obtain the 
needed relief from the municipality, such as building setbacks’ variances; 
and obtain appropriate reinsurance of title from the various title policy 
issuers—in the process resurrecting the neighborhood’s development and 
emotional health.  In a variety of circumstances, allowing many trades 
among multiple parties is an improvement over limiting the number of 
trades, a fact borne out in research178 as well as in real life.179 
B.  The Player to be Named Later and Other Deferred Compensation 
Major League Baseball teams often postpone the final terms of a player 
trade in order to better assess personnel needed for improvement—or what 
assets possessed by the other team are most marketable in order to improve 
those weakest positions—and to better judge the other team’s talent before 
finalizing the deal.180  In structuring a “player to be named later” exchange, 
teams generally agree on a list of five to ten players from which the team’s 
final selection will be made.181  Conventionally, players to be named later 
are too “new” to professional baseball to assess their talent at maturity.182  
Two rules govern player to be named later transactions: the deal must close 
within six months and the player must change leagues—which is why most 
players to be named later are minor leaguers.183  In truth, the player to be 
named later, in the majority of cases, turns out to be of no special 
 
 178. See, e.g., Christopher Bruce & Jeremy Clark, The Efficiency of Direct Public Involvement 
in Environmental Policymaking: An Experimental Test, 45 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 157, 172 
(2010). 
 179. See Menkel-Meadow, Getting to “Let’s Talk”, supra note 80, at 850 (describing political 
leaders engaging multiple parties in alternative solutions through multiparty consensus building 
processes). 
 180. See Rob Neyer, Transactions Primer, ESPN (Sept. 8, 1999), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=46397&type=story; What Is a Player to Be Named Later?, 
SLATE.COM (Aug. 3, 2000, 5:12 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2000/08/what_is_a_player_to_be_named
_later.html. 
 181. See What Is a Player to Be Named Later?, supra note 180; BRADBURY, supra note 106, at 
155. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id.at 154. 
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consequence to the team “owed” the player.184  Thus, the recipient usually 
designates the player to be named later for assignment185 or places him on 
waivers186 without ever optioning that player to its minor league team 
affiliate for development or seasoning.187  This circumstance illustrates the 
reality that for any supposed “Pareto Improvement,” some “losers” are never 
fully compensated, thereby supporting the potential Pareto criterion 
underlying Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.188  These admittedly are not idealized 
conditions leading to a Pareto-efficient outcome.  Periodically, trades 
involving a player to be named later results in a “thrown in,” but ultimately 
contributing big-league player,189  or these trades result in an in-lieu payment 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Meaning, the team has ten days to trade the player, outright the contract—and if not 
claimed by another team, enabling the player to become a free agent—, or simply release the player 
from his contract.  FRED CLAIRE & STEVE SPRINGER, FRED CLAIRE: MY 30 YEARS IN DODGER BLUE 
189 (2004).  See also LEWIS, supra note 5, at 214. 
 186. Waivers are a way to move players after the annual trading deadline about two months 
before the regular season ends.  See RANDALL, supra note 120, at 25-26.  When a player is placed on 
waivers, other teams in reverse order of the standings—first within the original team’s league, then 
the other league—have an opportunity to claim the waived player.  Id.  If no one asserts a claim, the 
player has “cleared waivers” and can be traded anywhere.  Id.  But if a claim is asserted, there are 
three possibilities: (1) the team placing the player on waivers can pull him off the list, no longer 
making him available to trade for that season; (2) the team can work out a trade and send the player 
to the team that “claimed” the player; or (3) the waiving team can let the claiming team take his 
services and his contract.  Id. 
 187. The practice of “optioning” exists where a major league club sells a player’s contract—and 
the right to his services—to the minor league team, reserving an option to repurchase his contract at 
a stipulated price; however, there are limits on the number of times this opportunity can be elected 
by the major league team.  Rob Neyer, Transactions Primer, ESPN (Sept. 8, 2007), 
http://assets.espn.go.com/mlb/s/transanctionsprimer.html.  If a player is on the forty-man roster and 
not the active twenty-five-man roster for any part of more than three seasons—in which he spent 
twenty or more total days of service in the minors—, he is out of options and may not be assigned to 
the minors without first clearing waivers.  Id.  However, if a player has less than five years of 
professional experience, he may be optioned to the minors in a fourth season without being subject 
to waivers.  Id. 
 188. The notion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency does not entail winners actually compensating 
losers.  Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic 
Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221, 239 (1980).  Therefore, a redistribution of resources is 
said to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient if, and only if, it is a “possible” Pareto-superior redistribution of 
resources.  Id.  Guido Calabresi takes exception to the views of Kaldor-Hicks.  Calabresi, supra note 
115, at 1221-27. 
 189. Jeremy Bonderman, Scott Podsednik, Coco Crisp, Moisés Alou, Jason Schmidt, and David 
Ortiz are primary illustrations of players to be named later that “made good” in the major leagues.  
See, e.g., Kara Richey, MLB Trade Deadline: David Ortiz and the Best Players to Be Named Later, 
BLEACHER REPORT (Aug. 1, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/786418-mlb-trades-david-
ortiz-and-the-best-players-to-be-named-later. 
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of cash to the team owed the “forthcoming” player, therefore, the convention 
survives despite the team owed the player rarely being appropriately 
compensated.190 
The primary lesson to be derived from the player to be named later 
convention, is that some elements of a problem’s solution can be postponed 
thereby reaching settlement of sufficiently satisfying magnitude without 
knowing all final details of the accord.  The broad outline of settlement, not 
the minutiae, is what matters, particularly when time is essential in reaching 
a joint solution in problem solving.  The Five-Tool Mediator cannot allow 
insistence on a global understanding, where every last detail is cemented to 
the satisfaction of every stakeholder, to stymie agreement on a joint solution.  
The parties can agree later on complete specifics following the point where 
the exchange of remaining values is relatively inconsequential.  In such a 
scenario, the circumstances resemble the clubs’ low mutual expectations for 
the future value of the player to be named later.191 
C.  Designating a Player for Assignment 
Designation for assignment is a way to release a player from the team’s 
future payroll.192  Designation leaves open the possibility that another team 
will claim that player—absorbing his accompanying compensation—freeing 
the releasing team’s cash for its remaining financial obligations.193  
Maximization of trades requires the view that what appears initially merely 
as “salary offloading,” is in fact, an opportunity to achieve numerous other 
objectives of the assignment-designating team.  These objectives include (1) 
reducing payroll to remain within salary cap regulations, and avoiding the 
“luxury tax” imposed on teams with payrolls well exceeding the balance of 
the league’s clubs; (2) addressing roster weaknesses by adding a player to 
increase its talent pool; (3) affording another franchise roster player an 
opportunity to play in the everyday lineup of a club, thereby maximizing his 
utility when that option may not have been available prior to the designated 
 
 190. Conventional wisdom says that the later named player does not often have a productive 
major league career.  See BRADBURY, supra note 106, at 155. 
 191. But see John H. Wade, Crossing the Last Gap, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK: THE 
DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 467, 467-74 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider &  
Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006).  Wade reminds the reader that the devil resides within the finest 
of details, and that circumstances may render what ordinarily would be “parking lot issues” into core 
stumbling blocks to problem solving.  Id. 
 192. This release is subject to Article IX of the Basic Agreement, which calls for formulaic 
termination pay for the year of the designation for assignment.  See Basic Agreement, supra note 88, 
at art. IX. 
 193. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 214. 
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player’s assignment; and (4) achieving greater balance between a team’s 
expenses against revenues, irrespective of salary cap limits.194  A key lesson 
here for mediators is that one party’s liabilities present opportunities—not 
necessarily as a limited-sum proposition but a win-win condition instead—
and that essentially the greater the quantity of mediums introduced into the 
assets exchange process, the greater the likelihood that all circumstances 
improve.  The mediator must emphasize to the stakeholders that asset value 
can be derived from one party’s apparent liabilities, and that oppositional or 
complementary “trades” can satisfy a party’s vital needs in the process of 
meeting the essential needs of another party, thereby expanding ways of 
sharing.195 
D. Split-Pool Revenue Sharing 
As Major League Baseball owners became aware of market forces 
accompanying the demographic structures of team locations, a split-pool 
revenue sharing system was devised to assist the smaller market teams.196  
Each franchise today is “taxed” 34% on the local revenue of the stadium-
generated proceeds—such as gate revenue and concession sales—net of 
stadium expenses—and excluding non-stadium based income such as 
income generated by media broadcast contracts, which constitute about 40% 
of Major League Baseball’s overall revenues.197  These tax receipts are 
pooled and shared equally among all thirty teams, but the lower-revenue-
generating teams—that is, lower than the league’s net arithmetic mean—
receive shares of a second pool that is funded by “richer” teams.198  
Economists acknowledge that revenue sharing has little if any effect on the 
distribution of talent within Major League Baseball.199  Such sharing does 
increase the profits of small-market franchises, although its impact on the 
 
 194. See Jeff Aberle, MLB Transactions Part Three: Waivers and DFA, PURPLEROW.COM 
(Feb. 19, 2009, 4:30 PM), http://www.purplerow.com/2009/2/19/762532/mlb-transactions-part-thre. 
 195. See Menkel-Meadow, Consensus Building, supra note 10, at 43. 
 196. See ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL ECONOMICS, supra note 41, at 50. 
 197. See Staudohar, supra note 84, at 16-18. 
 198. See id. at 21. 
 199. Helmut Dietl, Markus Lang & Alexander Rathke, The Combined Effect of Salary 
Restrictions and Revenue Sharing in Sports Leagues 9-11 (Inst. for Strategy & Bus. Econ. Univ. of 
Zurich, Working Paper No. 102, 2010), available at 
http://www.isu.uzh.ch/static/ISU_WPS/102_ISU_full.pdf.  Presumably, the wealthier franchises 
simply “outbid” their poorer brothers for the talent of free agent players on the open market. 
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profits of large-market clubs is less clear.200  Revenue sharing is an effective 
tool for cross-subsidization201 as well as providing a vehicle for parity of 
player talent across Major League Baseball.202  This illustration from Major 
League Baseball operations provide important lessons to mediators when 
communicating to parties, such as: (1) that survival of the stakeholders as a 
group in an interdependent system has greater value than optimal prosperity 
of fewer than all the stakeholders, and (2) that cross-subsidization is 
intuitively virtuous—in addition to having the benefit of enhancing trust 
creation—even if there is no competitive justification for subsidizing weaker 
stakeholders.  The de facto receivership over the Los Angeles Dodgers 
franchise, impressed on club owner Frank McCourt by Commissioner Bud 
Selig on April 20, 2011, well illustrates this reality.203 
 
 
 200. Id. at 5-7. 
 201. Id. at 25. 
 202. See Joel G. Maxcy, Progressive Revenue Sharing in MLB: The Effect on Player Transfers 
13, 24-26 (N. Am. Ass’n of Sports Economists, Working Paper No. 07-28, 2007) available at 
http://college.holycross.edu/RePEc/spe/Maxcy_Transfers2.pdf (concluding that low revenue-
generating clubs react to increased sharing incentives to divest themselves of talent, so that no 
reinvestment of revenue sharing funds in purchasing current major league player talent occurs).  
Supporters of revenue sharing contend that the investment by the lower revenue-generating teams 
occurs through the franchises’ minor league farm systems, producing more talent over a longer 
duration.  Id. at 14. 
 203. “I have taken this action because of my deep concern regarding the finances and 
operations of the Dodgers to protect the best interests of the club,” Selig announced on April 20, 
2011, in explaining his decision to take over operation of the Dodgers.  John M. Curtis, LA Dodgers 
Driven into Receivership, LA CITY BUZZ, Apr. 22, 2011, http://www.examiner.com/city-buzz-in-
los-angeles/la-dodgers-driven-into-receivership.  Appointing a trustee is unprecedented in Major 
League Baseball history.  Id.  By contrast, Commissioner Selig did not remove Texas Rangers’ 
owner Tom Hicks before seeking new ownership for that franchise; instead, it eventually sold out of 
a bankruptcy to a new ownership group in 2010.  Id.  The Commissioner has such authority pursuant 
to the Major League Constitution art. II, § 3 (owner conduct “deemed by the Commissioner not to be 
in the best interests of Baseball” authorizes him to suspend or remove any owner or take such other 
actions as he deems appropriate) and art. VI, § 2 (the Clubs “on behalf of their owners . . . severally 
agree to be finally and unappealably bound by actions of the Commissioner . . . taken or reached 
pursuant to the provisions of this Constitution” and waive their rights of recourse to the courts).  The 
Darwinian approach in this circumstance might have been for the other franchise owners to withhold 
support from the Commissioner’s decision and to wait for the opportunity to cherry-pick players 
from the Dodgers through bankruptcy.  This opportunity may be presented by the Dodgers’ 
bankruptcy filed June 27, 2011.  See In re Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, No. 11-12010 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2011).  Given the size of the Dodgers’ fan base and its marketplace, together with revenue sharing, 
such an approach by the other owners would be shortsighted indeed. 
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VII.  FIFTH MEDIATOR TOOL: CONSTRUCTS A RESONANT 
SOLUTION NARRATIVE 
This mediator tool is not synonymous with “selling a settlement.”  The 
capacity to construct a resonant narrative predates full knowledge of those 
terms under which a problem will be resolved.  The result of proper 
construction of the narrative is that the parties’ representatives are able to 
envision themes leading to a settlement framework.  If the parties can 
visualize a platform by which problem solving can occur, they will join the 
conversation in a contributing fashion.  The following is an explanation of 
the key characteristics of the resonant settlement narrative. 
First, the narrative must be plausible, facilitating the parties’ recognition 
of a rational solution204 to a problem that is affordable, achievable, and 
transparent.205  Second, the narrative must be coherent, describing to the 
parties a solution that is global and, as nearly as possible at the outset, 
comprehensive.206  Disputants may identify pathways to achieve most of 
their vital interests without dashing the fundamental expectations of the 
other stakeholders.207  Key ingredients of the coherent narrative are (1) a 
description of a process that is both mutually advantageous and leads to a 
fair outcome, such as the equitable division of resources and responsibilities, 
and (2) suggestions of a platform for how the resolution will be implemented 
and, throughout its continuation, enforced.208 
Lastly, the narrative must describe the sustainable nature of the 
agreement by addressing the solution’s lasting nature, at least in its key 
elements—subject to some non-essential alterations following a threshold 
period beyond the facilitation process.209  Sustainability may feature 
penalties to be assessed—or bonds to be forfeited—for defecting from the 
 
 204. Strong, supra note 49, at 791-95.  For mediators, this requires the imaginative reasoning 
process sometimes referred to as “abduction” (a term first coined by Charles Sanders Peirce), 
enabling perception of hypotheses that are not immediately apparent.  Id. at 791-92.  Here, scattered 
data is abductively, through the process of pattern recognition, grasped as a whole; thus, enabling 
subsequent data to be pieced together into the expanding composite picture.  Id. at 793-95.  This 
task, then, is performed by largely nonanalytical thought processes.  Id. at 795. 
 205. Id. at 791-95. 
 206. Professor Strong summarizes the capacity of the right hemisphere to generate “the 
complete whole from incomplete or rearranged fragments.”  Id. at 771. 
 207. See, FISHER, supra note 57, at 197. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See Mary Parker Follett, Constructive Conflict, in DYNAMIC ADMINISTRATION: THE 
COLLECTED PAPERS OF MARY PARKER FOLLETT 30, 36 (Henry C. Metcalf & L. Urwick eds., 1941). 
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agreement or incentives for ongoing cooperation,210 appointing a third party 
to maintain the cooperative environment,211 and ongoing encounters 
requiring future interactions between the former foes.212 
The resonant narrative appeals to the subconscious mind of those who 
escaped a wounded childhood.  In a healthy family structure, the parents—or 
other leaders—construct a narrative of the family unit in which each member 
gains a sense of belonging and comprehends his or her role, unthreatened by 
others within and outside the family circle.213  In the same way that a 
resonant narrative within a family builds a child’s self-confidence, a 
common vision of a solution to a joint problem, woven by the mediator, 
addresses the fundamental rational desires of each stakeholder.214  While the 
successful settlement narrative requires the element of sustainability, this is 
quite different than the notion of finality.215  There are two key distinctions 
between these elements.  First, the sustainable narrative is not, when initially 
articulated by the mediator, sufficiently detailed to satisfy any longing for a 
comprehensive solution that ends the need for any decision making.216  As 
used here, sustainability does not bypass hard work necessary to achieve 
final settlement.217  An effective narrative stirs the imaginations of the 
stakeholders’ representatives, enabling genuine, good-faith participation in 
bargaining.218  This creative force, giving momentum to the parties’ 
 
 210. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 57, at 197 (explaining that using side payments, such as 
money, social, or emotional awards can help sustain your coalition). 
 211. Id. at 184-85.  These elements may include the parties’ agreement to trust the enforcement 
authority of the third party, allowing the third party to hold a performance bond or to dispense 
liquidated damages to compensate for defection from a portion of the agreement.  Id. at 184-85, 196.  
But see id. (explaining that benelovent authority, relying on external authority, can be ineffective 
because of third parties own self-interest and craze for power). 
 212. Game theorists conclude that obligations to interact in the future nearly always enhance 
cooperation under an agreement.  Id. at 196. 
 213. Jennifer G. Bohanek, Kelly A. Marin, Robyn Fivush & Marshall P. Duke, Family 
Narrative Interaction and Children’s Sense of Self, 45 FAM. PROCESS 39, 48 (2006) (explaining that 
because children’s perspectives are validated and integrated in this environment, their self-esteem is 
high). 
 214. See JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, PRACTICING NARRATIVE MEDIATION: 
LOOSENING THE GRIP OF CONFLICT 10, 18, 146-48 (2008). 
 215. Follett, supra note 209, at 32 (discussing that a step of integration is necessary, see, e.g., 
id., a compromise doesn’t really resolve the problem; rather, an integrated solution “means that a 
solution has been found in which both desires have a place that neither side had to sacrifice 
anything”). 
 216. Id. at 41 (describing integration as a long process in which there are many steps such as 
uncovering the real conflict and identifying the demands of both sides in order to break them down). 
 217. Id. at 36 (concluding that only full integration brings about sustainability to conflicts). 
 218. Professor Strong notes that the right brain plays a vital role both in receiving and 
conveying information in the form of a narrative and in the creative generation of hypotheses—
”what if we”—in the legal problem-solving process.  Strong, supra note 49, at 775.  Here, the 
34
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol12/iss1/3
[Vol. 12: 97, 2012]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
131 
“invention,” is a foundation principle of an integrative solution to a joint 
problem first espoused by Mary Parker Follett in the 1930s.219  Second, any 
comprehensive solution to a complex, multiparty conflict likely will require 
“re-trading” at a later juncture—without implying treachery on the part of 
the mediator or any stakeholder.220 
Few immutable solutions persist in the fluid environment of modern life, 
outside forces which have little reason—if conscious—to endorse 
permanence will affect the initial settlement scenario.221  Re-envisioning the 
global solution may be advantageous to all stakeholders, even before certain 
elements are implemented.222  However, this circumstance does not indicate 
a failure to anticipate future events—some sudden, others unpredictable.223  
If the mediator engages the parties and their counsel in problem solving, the 
stakeholders’ representatives (in right hemispheric-dominant mode) will 
 
essential skill is that of weaving seemingly unrelated ingredients underlying a solution into 
coherence, or a meaningful metaphoric expression.  MCGILCHRIST, THE DIVIDED BRAIN, supra note 
14, at 51.  The author describes a metaphor’s purpose as “to being together the whole of one thing 
with the whole of another, so that each is looked at in a different light.”  Id. at 117. 
 219. Follett, supra note 209, at 33 (“Integration involves invention, and the clever thing is to 
recognize this, and not to let one’s thinking stay within the boundaries of two alternatives which are 
mutually exclusive.”).  Follett refers here, of course, to eschewing the binary code world of “off” and 
“on” alternatives in which the left hemisphere selects the single “best” solution that fits what it 
already knows and latches onto it.  See MCGILCHRIST, THE DIVIDED BRAIN, supra note 14, at 41; 
McGilchrist, Reciprocal Organization, supra note 55, at 324. 
 220. Professor Menkel-Meadow observes that the increasing use of incremental, flexible, and 
contingent settlements in complex controversies which recognize that tentative solutions, following 
testing and evaluation, may require renegotiation in light of the new information or changed 
circumstances generated by the tests or evaluation over time.  Menkel-Meadow, Getting to “Let’s 
Talk”, supra note 80, at 843.  Here, the left hemisphere is less efficient, as assumptions must be 
revised or new material must be distinguished from older information; in contrast, the right 
hemisphere keeps possible solutions “live” while alternative courses of action are investigated.  See 
MCGILCHRIST, THE DIVIDED BRAIN, supra note 14, at 41; McGilchrist, Reciprocal Organization, 
supra note 55, at 324.  McGilchrist notes that the right hemisphere is attuned to apprehending 
anything new and is more capable of a “frame shift,” while the left hemisphere functions less 
efficiently when initial assumptions must be revised.  MCGILCHRIST, THE DIVIDED BRAIN, supra 
note 14, at 40. 
 221. Menkel-Meadow, Getting to “Let’s Talk”, supra note 80, at 843. 
 222. FISHER, supra note 57, at 197 (in discussing tips for cooperation, the author describes the 
benefits of global solutions). 
 223. See, c.f., Marcus Baram, CIA’s Mideast Surprise Recalls History of Intelligence Failures, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 11, 2011, 6:35 PM, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/cias-mideast-surprise-history-of-
failures_n_822183.html#s239132&title=Iranian_Revolution_1979.  Few if any outsiders anticipated 
Tunisia or Egypt’s use of wireless technology in the spring of 2011 to map out nonviolent 
revolutions prior to their commencements.  Id. 
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adapt their respective perceptions of vital interests to the narrative 
structure.224 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
One old bromide describes the mediation process as the adversaries’ 
last, best opportunity to dictate internally-engineered outcomes of their 
choosing.225  But when the realm of solution building encompasses no more 
than the conventional spectrum of resolution possibilities, parties naturally 
gravitate toward binary thought processes.226  Therefore, in a fault 
apportionment dispute where each party is convinced that he is no more than 
30% at fault for the harm caused, each may grudgingly yield a few “blame 
percentage points” to avoid diverting resources to adjudication as well as the 
risk of encountering imperfect fact finders.  Still, each party essentially 
fixates upon an upper limit to his responsibility.227  A joint resolution here 
may turn on each party’s acknowledging that fault apportionment does 
relatively little to resolve their mutual problems.228 
The Five-Tool Mediator is not content to relay mechanical or crudely-
constructed ad hoc proposals for “incrementally-improved” agreements 
between adversaries in a shuttle-diplomacy style.229  Instead, he is an 
agitator, teasing out declarations of the vital interests of each disputant 
stakeholder, creating an environment where maximum trades are possible, 
and selecting bold goals that are optimal, albeit seemingly infeasible, at the 
time they are devised.230  The Five-Tool Mediator silences voices decrying 
progress in deal making and encourages the forward movement of 
communications toward break-through collaboration.  She also strives to 
 
 224. McGilchrist notes that the right hemisphere specializes in accepting and processing 
uncertainty and ambiguity, having affinity for what is new, unknown, uncertain, and unbounded.  
See MCGILCHRIST, THE DIVIDED BRAIN, supra note 14, at 40-41; McGilchrist, Reciprocal 
Organization, supra note 55, at 327. 
 225. Hensler, supra note 5, at 182, 189-90. 
 226. MCGILCHRIST, THE DIVIDED BRAIN, supra note 14, at 40, 139 (explaining that the right 
hemisphere has more capability to “frame-shift” and, like computers, the brain recognizes “two 
binary codes of on and off”). 
 227. This illustrates left-brain dominance revealing its relative inflexibility.  McGilchrist notes 
that flexibility entails disengaging from focused attention—which persons with left hemispheric 
dominance have difficulty doing—because familiarity causes the left brain to focus more intently 
upon identification by parts in its attempt to know the whole, grasping what it already has broken 
apart, categorized, and prioritized.  MCGILCHRIST, THE DIVIDED BRAIN, supra note 14, at 40, 44-45, 
49-51. 
 228. Id. at 40, 44-45, 49-51. 
 229. See Sestanovich, supra note 77, at 21. 
 230.  Richard Holbrooke summarized his all-out strategy for achieving agreement this way: 
“Better a high benchmark than a weak compromise.”  Id. at 20. 
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persuade each foe to trust the others or, minimally, to demonstrate credible 
commitment to engender belief in the possibility of joint structuring and 
adhering to an agreement.231  Ultimately, the Five-Tool Mediator constructs 
a resonant narrative of problem solving to obtain the parties’ buy-in to a 
global and fair solution.232  This solution discourages defection strategies 
through a regimen of sanctions or rewards, including social, emotional, and 
financial rewards.233 
The Five-Tool Mediator uses the right-hemispheric specialization in 
stored “real world” perspectives, viewing each possibility for settlement in 
context within its surroundings.234  He also urges similar—although not 
exclusive—non-strictly analytical faculties to be used by the adversaries, 
enabling them to see the problem’s resolution by joining fragmented data 
into a unified composite.235  The Five-Tool Mediator adopts a set of attitudes 
designed to maximize the possibility for the creation of “better than” 
outcome solutions to complex disputes.236  She is also able to recognize that 
the dispute, at its root, is a shared problem that requires mutual study and 
conversation about creative solution building involving equitable sharing of 
finite resources.237  Disputants need counsel from such expert facilitators for 
successful conciliatory processes in contentious, complex decision-making 
scenarios, particularly during an impasse in negotiations.238  The Five-Tool 
Mediator will dismantle blockades caused either by a party’s habit of binary 
thought or his resolute refusal to engage in meaningful problem-solving 
processes, while weaving vital interests of each party into a narrative luring 
the imaginative faculties of the brain’s right hemisphere.  Concurrently, 
applying game theory in evaluating rational settlement postures—in Len 
Fisher’s words, “imposing logical discipline on the stories we tell”—will 
engage the mediator and the parties in a quantitative, left brain exercise 
complimenting the scenario-planning right brain effort.239 
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